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Economic Perspective 2 
PRIVATISIIC THE BRITISH AIRPORTS AUTHORITY: 
COMPETITION, CAPTURE AND CONTROL 
Karen Hancock and Kim Swales 
Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
Although apparent ly success fu l , the 
government's privatisation programme has 
faced much cr i t ic i sm over the manner in 
which i t has been implemented. This 
c r i t i c i s m has centered on p o t e n t i a l 
c o n f l i c t between the economic and 
po l i c i t a l aims of the policy. Conflict 
arises because, in most cases, in order to 
maximise economic e f f ic iency ga ins , 
pr iva t i sa t ion should be combined with 
l i be ra l i s a t i on . In other words, the 
change in ownership should be accompanied 
by greater competition. But i f the 
government creates a more competitive 
environment for the newly-privatised 
concern, three problems emerge. 
The major criticism of the government has 
been that when faced with these trade-
offs, short-run po l i t i ca l considerations 
have too often dominated. Currently, 
legislation is passing through Parliament 
to enable the privatisation of the British 
Ai rpor t s Author i ty (BAA). Detai led 
examination of this legislation provides a 
useful case study upon which to test such 
c r i t i c i sm. Pr ivat isa t ion of the BAA i s 
of particular concern to Scotland as this 
organisation currently has a near-monopoly 
of airport provision north of the border. 
Characteristics of the airports industry 
and the proposed legislation 
F i r s t , t h e f u t u r e p r o f i t s of the 
organisation are l ikely to be lower, and 
these wi l l be capi tal ised in a lower 
i n i t i a l share price. Therefore, the 
revenues raised by the programme, and the 
corresponding f a l l in the PSBR, will be 
reduced. Second, the speed and ease with 
which the privatisation programme can be 
carried out w i l l depend crucial ly on the 
degree of co-operation and commitment 
shown by the existing senior management. 
The more competitive the environment the 
government p lans to impose on these 
managers, the more uncertain and difficult 
will be their position in the future, and 
the less l ike ly they wil l be to support 
the Government's plans. Third, if the 
policy i s to be used to encourage wider 
share ownership, then such shares should 
be as attractive as possible. Shares in 
companies operating in very competitive 
markets are a risky investment for small 
shareholders (Sid). 
At present the BAA handles about 75% of 
B r i t i s h a i r passenger t r a f f i c . I t 
controls seven major airports: Gatwick, 
Heathrow, Stanstead, Prestwick, Aberdeen, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow. Other a i rpor ts 
are ei ther operated by local author i t ies 
or by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA): 
for example, Norwich is a local authority 
airport, whilst Inverness is controlled by 
the CAA. The indus t ry i s heav i ly -
regu la ted . The development of new 
a i r p o r t s i s severe ly r e s t r i c t e d by 
planning procedures. At the moment there 
i s excess a i rpor t capacity in Scotland, 
and excess demand at Heathrow and Gatwick. 
Landing charges made by a i rpor ts are 
controlled by the government through the 
CAA, and are covered by two major 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements: the 19^4 
Chicago Convention, and the UK/US 
b i l a t e ra l agreement known as Bermuda II . 
At present landing charges are extremely 
•The authors would l ike to thank Barry Potter for comments on ea r l i e r drafts of th i s 
paper. 
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low, and where a ipor t s make p ro f i t s i t i s 
p r i m a r i l y through t h e i r duty-free sa les , 
c a t e r i n g f a c i l i t i e s and c a r - p a r k i n g 
cha rges . F i n a l l y , t he government has 
power s t o a l l o c a t e t r a f f i c b e t w e e n 
a i r p o r t s . For example, a t the moment a l l 
d i r e c t t r a n s a t l a n t i c f l i g h t s in to and out 
of Scotland must use Prestwick. 
The Airports Po l i cy White Paper of 1985 
o u t l i n e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s t h i n k i n g 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r i v a t i s a t i o n of t h e 
BAA.CI) I t i s e n v i s a g e d t h a t t h e 
r e g u l a t i o n s p r e s e n t l y c o n t r o l l i n g the 
i n d u s t r y w i l l be r e t a i n e d . Moreover, i t 
i s planned to p r i v a t i s e BAA as a s i n g l e 
en t i t y : a p r iva te company w i l l be formed 
which w i l l have subs tan t ia l market power, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in Scot land and South-Eas t 
England. The d e c i s i o n not t o p r i v a t i s e 
each a i r p o r t s e p a r a t e l y appears curious, 
pa r t i cu l a r ly from a government ostensibly 
committed to a more competitive economy. 
The government has made f ive arguments in 
favour of a monopolistic market s t ruc ture 
for the BAA. A d e t a i l e d s c r u t i n y of 
these arguments seems in order. 
1 . The impossibility of competition 
The government a rgues t h a t three factors 
determine an a i r l i n e ' s demand for landing 
r i g h t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r a i r p o r t : p r i c e 
( l a n d i n g c h a r g e s ) , l o c a t i o n , and t h e 
amount of i n t e r l i n i n g t r a f f i c , i e 
p a s s e n g e r s c h a n g i n g p l a n e s . The 
government's posi t ion i s t ha t price cannot 
be used as a mechanism for compe t i t i on 
between a i r p o r t s because landing charges 
form a very smal l p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l 
a i r l i n e c o s t s and " [o ]u r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o b l i g a t i o n s p reven t us from r a i s i n g our 
charges to a level which would r e f l ec t the 
t rue value of access to the most favoured 
a i r p o r t s and t h u s p r e c l u d e p r i c e 
competition".(2) The government believes 
tha t the most important determinant of an 
a i rpo r t ' s market i s i t s locat ion, which i s 
fixed, and t ha t the amount of in t e r l in ing 
t r a f f i c i s gove rned by t h e s i z e and 
l o c a t i o n of t h e a i r p o r t r a t h e r t h a n 
l a n d i n g c h a r g e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e 
government concludes t h a t t h e r e i s no 
scope for competition between a i rpor t s . 
Such a p e s s i m i s t i c a s sessmen t of the 
p o t e n t i a l f o r c o m p e t i t i o n s e e m s 
u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y d e f e a t i s t . As far 
as the scope for p r i c e compe t i t i on i s 
concerned, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements 
which dea l w i th l and ing charges a r e very 
loosley-worded. I t has been argued t ha t 
p r i c e c o m p e t i t i o n c o n s i s t e n t w i th t h e s e 
agreements could be achieved by se t t ing up 
a market for access r igh t s to a i rpo r t s a t 
specif ic t imes (s lo ts ) and allowing resa le 
of such r i g h t s . ( 3 ) Under such a scheme, 
the r e l a t i ve a t t r ac t iveness of the various 
a i r p o r t s t o t h e a i r l i n e s would be 
r e f l e c t e d in the p r i c e of a s l o t . S l o t s 
a t S c o t t i s h a i r p o r t s would presumably 
command a l o w e r p r i c e t h a n t h o s e a t 
Heathrow, but the high p r i c e of s l o t s a t 
Heathrow would cause some a i r l i n e s t o 
s w i t c h t h e i r r o u t e s t o Ga twick or 
Stanstead. 
A m a r k e t f o r s l o t s would o f f e r an 
effect ive mechanism for ensuring tha t the 
p r i c e d i f f e r e n t i a l s between a i r p o r t s 
r e f l e c t e d r e a l economic f a c t o r s , such as 
the e x t e n t t o which each a i r p o r t can 
command a loca l monopoly. At the moment, 
t h e p r i c e mechanism i s n o t used t o 
d i s t r i b u t e the t r a f f i c between a i r p o r t s , 
and consequent ly t hose a i r l i n e s enjoying 
the p r i v i l e g e of l and ing a t Heathrow a re 
able to earn p ro f i t s far in excess of what 
they would otherwise be able to earn. In 
o t h e r words , t he a i r l i n e s cap tu r e the 
economic r e n t e lement f lowing from an 
a i r p o r t ' s f a v o u r a b l e l o c a t i o n . I f 
a i r l i n e s had to bid for s l o t s , t he BAA 
would receive these economic r en t s , which 
would be cap i t a l i sed in the share pr ice so 
t h a t the taxpayer would b e n e f i t upon 
p r iva t i s a t ion . Further, each a i rpor t has 
an i n c e n t i v e t o f i l l any s l o t as long as 
the price paid i s grea ter than the cost of 
s e r v i c i n g t h e l a n d i n g . This means t h a t 
the possible adverse a l loca t ive ef fec ts of 
each a i rpo r t ' s loca l monopoly s t a tus would 
be minimised. A f i n a l de f ec t of the 
present system i s t h a t i t poses a b a r r i e r 
t o e n t r y t o new a i r l i n e s which have 
l imi ted or no access t o the most favoured 
a i r p o r t s . 
The government a s s e r t s tha t a i r l i n e s a re 
very s e n s i t i v e t o a i r p o r t l o c a t i o n and 
r e l a t ive ly insens i t ive to landing charges. 
However, t h e r e appear to be no e m p i r i c a l 
t e s t s of t h i s a s s e r t i o n . The main 
problem i s t ha t landing charges and choice 
of a i r p o r t h a v e i n t h e p a s t b e e n 
c o n t r o l l e d t o a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r e x t e n t 
by the government. No-one knows how a 
deregulated market would work. A reason 
for assuming t h a t demand i s insens i t ive to 
l and ing cha rges i s t h a t a t p r e s e n t they 
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make up a re la t ive ly small proportion of 
an a i r l i ne ' s costs . But two important 
points should be made here. F i r s t , if 
landing charges were increased to reflect 
the s c a r c i t y of access to c e r t a i n 
a i rpor t s , the i r importance would clearly 
r i s e . Second, t h e r e a r e q u i t e 
considerable variations in the proportion 
of an a i r l i ne t i cke t ' s price which i s 
composed of landing charges. In 
par t icular , on shor t -hau l rou tes (eg 
London-Glasgow), the landing charge can 
account for as much as 10% of the t icke t 
price, as against the average of 5% for 
a l l routes .W Therefore, short-haul 
t ra f f ic might be sensi t ive to changes in 
landing charges, even if landing charges 
remain around their present levels. 
We feel that price competition between 
a i r p o r t s i s pos s ib l e and t h a t a f t e r 
privatisation the BAA, which will then be 
charged with maximising prof i ts for i t s 
shareholders, will press for a relaxation 
of the present pricing rules . However, 
even i f such changes were not made, 
a i rpor ts can compete in other ways. An 
a i r l i ne ' s decision to use a par t icular 
a i rport wi l l depend on passenger demand 
and the cos t of using t ha t a i r p o r t . 
Passenger demand w i l l clearly be heavily 
influenced by location and the extent of 
in te r - l in ing t r a f f i c . However, other 
factors wil l play a part too: such as, 
the standard of surface t r a n s p o r t 
connections, baggage handling f a c i l i t i e s , 
car parking ava i l ab i l i ty and restaurant 
and shopping provision. Additionally, 
airports can engage in marketing, support 
the mounting of new routes or flights for 
the airlines and provide better faci l i t ies 
for airlines so that turnaround times and 
taxi-ing costs are reduced. Such forms 
of non-price competition are more l ikely 
to be impor tant where a i r p o r t s have 
overlapping catchment a r ea s , as for 
example in the central belt of Scotland. 
2. The undesirability of competition 
In moving the second reading of the 
Airports' Bill , Nicholas Ridley, the then 
Secretary of Sta te for Transport, argued 
that even if airports were able to compete 
on landing charges, such competition would 
have undesirable consequences. For 
example, domestic and feeder traffic would 
tend to be squeezed out of Heathrow in 
favour of the more profitable European and 
long-haul traffic. This could adversely 
affect Scottish a i rpor t s , as they are 
heavi ly dependent on London rou te s : 
Scottish-London t ra f f ic accounts for 57% 
of the combined business of Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Aberdeen airports. 
Two points should be noted here. First, 
th i s argument assumes there is scope for 
price competition. Second, the problem 
identified stems not from the form in 
which p r iva t i sa t ion takes p lace , but 
rather from the change in objectives which 
pr iva t i sa t ion wil l impose. In short, a 
privatised BAA w i l l be concerned with 
profits, not regional equity. If this is 
seen as undesirable, i t simply strengthens 
any exist ing argument for the continued 
regulation of the BAA airports. Tne only 
relevance th i s has for the question of 
whether the BAA a i r p o r t s should be 
privatised as a group or individually i s 
which form of p r i v a t i s a t i o n can be 
regulated more effectively. This i s an 
issue to which we return l a t e r in the 
paper. 
3. Greater internal efficiency through 
economies of scale 
In the White Paper, the government argued 
that there are economies of scale in 
a i rport management so that the jo in t 
pr iva t i sa t ion of the BAA would have cost 
advantages. Part icular emphasis was 
given to the b e n e f i t s for Sco t t i sh 
a i rpor ts from economies in centra l ly-
provided management s e rv i ces such as 
t ra ining, financial control and senior 
management supervision, though neither the 
government nor the BAA presented empirical 
r e su l t s to substant iate these claims. 
However, work carried out by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies found no evidence of 
economies of scale within BAA over the 
period 1969 to 1981, a period during which 
BAA expanded to include Aberdeen, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh airports. 
The economies of sca le argument i s 
u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d . However, o t h e r 
re la t ionships between company size and 
efficiency appear to favour privat is ing 
the BAA a i rpor t s individually. One of 
the main arguments for pr ivat isa t ion is 
that the company becomes subject to the 
discipline of the stock market. Briefly, 
an ineff ic ient company wil l have a share 
price which f a i l s to ref lec t fully the 
prof i t potent ial of the assets i t owns. 
As such i t will be vulnerable to takeover 
where the managers are l i k e l y to be 
replaced. In the strong version of this 
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argument, the very threat of takeover i s 
enough to ensure that company management 
remains efficient. 
However, th i s mechanism works l e s s than 
perfect ly. In par t i cu la r , empirical 
s t u d i e s suggest t h a t s tock market 
d i sc ip l ine i s more s t r ingent for small 
firms in competitive markets than large 
monopolistic concerns.(5) There are a 
number of reasons why th i s might be the 
c a s e . One i s t h a t t he e x i s t i n g 
management have an informational advantage 
over prospective bidders because outsiders 
w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y in accu ra t e ly 
calculat ing the prof i t potent ial of a 
firm's asse t s . This di f f icul ty wi l l be 
greater with monopolistic firms. Where 
there are a large number of firms in the 
industry, the company's competitors can be 
used as comparators: in a monopolistic 
industry such close comparison i s not 
available. 
A f inal argument relevant under th i s 
heading i s tha t the government has often 
attempted to use privatisation as a means 
of increasing workers shareholding in 
their own firms. The claim is that this 
should improve company efficiency, as 
individual workers w i l l have a d i rec t 
i n c e n t i v e to i n c r e a s e the company's 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . In as f a r as t h i s 
argument i s valid, i t should have greater 
force, the smaller the privatised concern. 
Moreover, the government generally i s in 
favour of smaller companies, praising 
t h e i r dynamism and record of job 
generation in the recent past. I t i s 
therefore strange to find the government's 
a l lowing the BAA's cur ren t publici ty 
campaign which s t resses the fact tha t i t 
is the world's largest airport authority. 
4. Ease of regulation 
Even after privatisation UK airports will 
be opera t ing in a h e a v i l y - r e g u l a t e d 
environment. The government w i l l 
continue, through the CAA, to pursue 
national avaiat ion pol ic ies on matters 
such as route licensing, control of major 
i n v e s t m e n t s , s a f e t y and s e c u r i t y . 
Moreover, major airports will have strong 
local monopolies, and w i l l therefore be 
subject to periodic scrutiny from the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC). 
The form privatisation takes wil l affect 
the ease and effectiveness of Government 
regulation of the industry. The White 
Paper argues: "Privatising BAA as a whole 
wi l l re ta in maximum f l ex ib i l i t y in the 
administration of Government aviation 
policies". 
There i s c lear ly some substance to t h i s 
claim: control i s l ike ly to be simpler 
with fewer, rather than more, managements 
to deal wi th . However, t he r e i s a 
problem concerning the effectiveness of 
regulation under these c i rcumstances . 
Again, the issue involves information. 
Aviat ion po l icy w i l l be made using 
information on technical possibili t ies and 
costs derived primarily from a monopolised 
group of seven a i r p o r t s . Such 
information i s likely to be inadequate or 
even misleading. First , the information 
will primarily be coming from one source 
which has an incentive to present that 
information in ways which favour the 
bus iness r a t h e r than en l igh ten the 
r e l e v a n t r egu la to ry body. Second, 
monopolies have a weaker incentive to 
control costs than competitive concerns. 
Therefore, data on production are not 
l i k e l y to r evea l the bes t p r a c t i c e 
techniques. More useful information 
would be obtained from the managements of 
seven independent airports competing for 
business. 
Moreover, if there i s only one source of 
information, there i s a strong possibility 
that the regulatory body (whether the CAA 
or the MMC) wil l be "captured" by the 
organisation i t i s supposed to regulate. 
BAA pic wi l l be able to claim that i t 
speaks for the industry when i t offers 
opinions on matters relating to airports, 
and i t s voice i s l ike ly to be heeded. 
BAA pic will argue for i t s own interests, 
which a r e l i k e l y t o favour more 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on compet i t ion between 
a i rpor t s and consequently be detrimental 
to consumers' i n t e r e s t s . This general 
problem of "capture" has been recognised 
for some time in the US where there i s 
considerable experience of the practical 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of the public regulation of 
private monopolies. 
5. F a c i l i t a t e implementation of the 
Scottish Airports Policy 
In the Airports Policy White Paper, the 
government reaffirmed i t s commitment to 
the Scott ish Lowland Airports policy. 
Prestwick airport, which is making a loss 
and which happens to be located in the 
cons t i tuency of George Younger, the 
p resen t Min i s t e r of Defence, i s to 
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continue as Scotland's sole t r ansa t l an t i c 
airport. The situation will be reviewed 
in 1989, when the government hopes that 
Prestwick's economic performance will have 
improved, though th i s hope seems rather 
optimistic. (6) 
I f t he a i r p o r t s were p r i v a t i s e d 
individually, Prestwick would only find a 
buyer a t a negat ive p r i c e . If the 
government were not prepared to pay 
overtly to dispose of Prestwick, the 
a i rpor t would have to remain in public 
ownership and competitive tenders invited 
for keeping i t open at minimum cost, much 
as i s being done for unprofitable bus 
r o u t e s . On the other hand, i f the 
a i r p o r t s a re p r i v a t i s e d jo in t ly , the 
losses at Prestwick (and also Stanstead) 
will be cross-subsidised from the profits 
of the other five airports. 
I t might be thought that under j o in t 
pr iva t i sa t ion the losses of operating 
Prestwick and Stanstead wi l l be borne by 
the shareholders of BAA pic. This i s 
erroneous. These l o s s e s w i l l be 
capi tal ised in BAA's share price at the 
time of f lo ta t ion , and wi l l therefore be 
financed ultimately by the taxpayer. In 
r e a l i t y , the Scottish Lowland Airports 
policy could be pursued under e i ther of 
the options for privatisation. The main 
difference i s that jo in t pr iva t i sa t ion 
w i l l conceal the t rue cos t of the 
political decision to retain Prestwick. 
Competition, control and capture 
D i s c u s s i o n of t h e p r o b l e m s of 
pr iva t i sa t ion conventionally focuses on 
the conflict between the potential long-
term efficiency gains from liberalisation 
and the short-term revenue gains from the 
share flotation. Detailed examination of 
the BAA proposa ls r evea l s t h a t the 
interests of the existing management might 
unduly i n f l u e n c e t he form of the 
privatisation too. 
A number of elements of the case put 
forward by the government lend support to 
the not ion t h a t i t has a l ready been 
captured by the industry. F i r s t , there 
i s cons iderab le overlap between the 
evidence submitted to the government by 
the BAA and t h e gove rnmen t ' s own 
arguments. In p a r t i c u l a r , the BAA 
stressed the existence of economies of 
scale in the management of the seven 
a i r p o r t s . In the White Paper, the 
government appears to accept t h i s 
unsupported assert ion without question. 
Second, in arguing against the possibility 
or desirability of price competition, the 
government is allowing the economic rent 
of certain a i rpor t s ' unique locat ions to 
remain with those a i r l i nes which have 
favoured access . I m p l i c i t l y , a i r 
travellers are here being given precedence 
over the taxpayer. All appearances 
therefore suggest a complex chain of 
capture involving the a i r l i nes , the BAA 
and the government. 
The BAA i s to be privatised as a whole, 
giving i t a v i r tua l monopoly of airport 
provision in Scotland. The arguments in 
favour of such a structure appear to us to 
be very weak and fail to offset the strong 
economic arguments supporting competition. 
For Scotland to gain from pr iva t i sa t ion , 
l i be ra l i s a t ion must occur too. I t i s 
important to act soon. The MMC has never 
yet recommended the break-up of a monopoly 
tha t i s already in existence. Morever, 
the capture argument suggests that the MMC 
would be sympathetic to the BAA's views 
which are strongly opposed to any break-
up .^) 
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